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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Tanya White appealed from the district court's judgment of conviction for possession of
a controlled substance. She argued that the district court erred by denying her motion to suppress
her statements made after her unlawful arrest. She also argued that the district court erred by
denying her Idaho Criminal Rule 36 ("Rule 36") motion to correct a clerical error in the
judgment of conviction.
The State responded and contended that the district court correctly denied Ms. White's
motion to suppress. On the second issue, the State agreed that the district court erred in denying
Ms. White's Rule 36 motion to correct an error in the judgment.
This Reply Brief addresses to some, but not all, of the State's arguments on the
suppression issue.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Ms. White's Appellant's Brief set out the relevant facts and proceedings. They are not
repeated here, but are incorporated by reference. (App. Br., pp. I- I 0.)

I

ISSUES
I.

Did the district court err by denying Ms. White's motion to suppress when Deputy Brock
and Deputy Ellis arrested her without probable cause?

II.

Did the district court err by denying Ms. White's Rule 36 motion to correct a clerical
error in the judgment?

2

ARGUMENT
I.

The District Court Erred By Denying Ms. White's Motion To Suppress When Deputy Brock
And Deputy Ellis Arrested Her Without Probable Cause
On appeal, Ms. White made three main arguments challenging the district court's denial
of her motion to suppress. First, she argued that Deputy Brock and Deputy Ellis arrested her
when they restrained her in Walmart using handcuffs without any safety or flight justification.
(App. Br., pp.14-19.) Second, she argued that Deputy Brock and Deputy Ellis did not have
probable cause that she committed or was going to commit any crime at the time of her arrest.
(App. Br., pp.19-21.) Third, she argued that, due to her unlawful arrest, the district court should
have suppressed her statements because her statements were not sufficiently attenuated from the
illegal seizure. (App. Br., pp.21-26.) Ms. White replies to some of the State's arguments in
opposition below. For issues not addressed here, Ms. White respectfully refers the Court to her
Appellant's Brie£ (App. Br., pp.12-26.)
On the arrest, the State appears to assert that an officer can use handcuffs to detain an
individual, without any safety or flight justification, because handcuffing facilitates "a prompt
and efficient investigation." (Resp. Br., p.11.) While that may be true (handcuffing someone
certainly makes it easier to control them), that does not mean the use of handcuffs is justifiable.
There is no "ease and efficiency" exception to the Fourth Amendment. Otherwise, the Fourth
Amendment protection against unlawful searches and seizures would be meaningless-it is
always easier and more efficient for the police to simply restrain everyone at the scene and
search the place or item of interest. For de facto arrests specifically, the Court has not recognized
the police's objective for an "expeditious" investigation to justify the use of handcuffs. (See
Resp. Br., pp.11-14.) To the contrary, the Court has set a "high threshold ... to justify the use of
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handcuffs as part of an investigative detention." State v. Pannell, 127 Idaho 420,424 (1995). The
desire for a prompt investigation does not make the cut. 1
Here, Deputy Brock and Deputy Ellis' s decision to handcuff Ms. White was not justified
by safety or flight concerns. The State does not seem to dispute the absence of safety concerns,
such as a danger to the officers or others. (See Resp. Br., pp.9-14.) There was no evidence of
weapons or imminent violence. See Pannell, 127 Idaho at 424 ("the substantial risk of imminent
violence was readily apparent and justified the officer's use of 'reasonable force' to maintain the
'status quo"'). And, there was no real flight risk with respect to Ms. White. As explored in the
case law, (App. Br., pp.17-18), the risk of flight must be something more than a generalized
assumption that individuals being sought by the police have a tendency to flee. Deputy Brock did
not have much more than that, and he had far less than a "substantial risk" of flight. See Pannell,
127 Idaho at 424. Deputy Brock saw Mr. Mann and Ms. White go into Walmart, Mr. Mann
exited Walmart and abruptly walked back in, and then Deputy Brock found them after about
seven minutes of an alleged "cat-and-mouse" search. (R., pp. I 07-09; see State's Ex. 1,
13:27:04-13:34:15.) Importantly, it was Mr. Mann, not Ms. White, that quickly exited and
reentered Walmart. (R., p.108.) Ms. White was fully compliant with the deputies' commands.
(App. Br., p.17.) Even if the deputies suspected that Mr. Mann and Ms. White possessed
contraband while in Walmart, that alone does not justify the use of handcuffs because, again, it
would render handcuffs permissible for any drug-related investigatory detention. In summary,
1

Ms. White also respectfully disagrees with the State's "multifaceted, multi-suspect" description
to imply a complex investigation. (Resp. Br., p.14.) This was a simple case of possession of a
controlled substance. Mr. Tristan was fully compliant and admitted, almost immediately, to
Mr. Mann's marijuana use. (App. Br., p.2.) Deputy Brock and Deputy Ellis located Mr. Mann
and Ms. White in Walmart in less than ten minutes. (App. Br., p.2.) After the deputies took
Mr. Mann and Ms. White back to the car in handcuffs, there were three officers on the scene to
search the car and question the three restrained suspects. (App. Br., pp.18-19.) Nothing in the
video indicates a comp lex, challenging investigation to necessitate handcuffs. (See State's Ex. 1.)
4

the totality of the circumstances relied upon by the State to justify handcuffs are common factors
in most seizures and investigations and, therefore, do not justify the use of handcuffs.
On probable cause, the State contends that the facts here are similar to Maryland v.
Pringle, 540 U.S. 366 (2003), but that case is distinguishable on one salient fact-the discovery

of contraband. In Pringle, the officer had probable cause to arrest all three individuals, including
the defendant, after finding cocaine and cash in the car shared by them. Id. at 371-72. None of
the individuals admitted to ownership of the cocaine or cash. Id. at 372. In contrast to Pringle,
Deputy Brock had not found any controlled substances before he arrested Ms. White. (See
State's Ex. 1; see also Resp. Br., p.16.) All he had was an admission by Mr. Tristan that
Mr. Mann had smoked marijuana, which was in the trunk. (R., p.109.) Mr. Mann and Ms. White
were seated in the driver's seat and passenger's seat, respectively, before leaving the car for
Walmart. (R., p.108.) So, unlike Pringle where the officer knew that three individuals had access
and control over actual contraband, Deputy Brock had only an admission to potential access and
control over yet-to-be-seen contraband belonging to one individual. These facts were insufficient
to establish probable cause to arrest Ms. White. (See App. Br., pp.19-21.)
Finally, on attenuation, the State argues that the Court should examine the doctrine
differently because, in theory, the deputies could have detained Ms. White (short of an arrest),
questioned her, and searched the car. (Resp. Br., pp.19-20.) Put another way, the State submits
the Court should separate the "fruit" of Mr. White's de facto arrest from the "fruit" of
Ms. White's presence. (Resp. Br., pp.19-20.) The former would be illegally obtained, but the
latter would not, since Ms. White would have been detained anyway. (Resp. Br., pp.19-20.) The
Court has already flatly rejected the State's proposition. The attenuation doctrine, like the
independent source and inevitable discovery doctrines, does not consider what the police could
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have done, but what the police actually did. State v. Maxim, 165 Idaho 901, 908-10 (2019); State
v. Downing, 163 Idaho 26, 30-32 (2017). In this case, Deputy Brock should have initiated a

consensual encounter or a Terry 2 stop, but he did not. He chose to arrest Ms. White, without
probable cause, and the State cannot separate her statements from the unlawful arrest with a
hypothetical lawful action.
Along similar lines, the State contends the deputies' discovery of contraband and Deputy
Brock's reading of Miranda 3 warnings were both intervening circumstances to break the causal
chain between Ms. White's illegal arrest and her statements. (Resp. Br., pp.20-21.) First, the
discovery of contraband is irrelevant. Ms. White was not seeking to suppress the contraband.
(R., p.100.) The deputies' discovery of the contraband was independent from Ms. White's illegal
arrest-the deputies had probable cause to search the car after Mr. Tristan's admission. That
contraband has no impact on the chain between Ms. White's arrest and her statements. The State
argues again, in theory, since Deputy Brock could have arrested Ms. White after discovering the
contraband, this fictional lawful arrest somehow cures the actual unlawful one. (Resp. Br., p.20.)
It does not. Ms. White's statements were still the product of her illegal seizure, and the State has

presented no concrete evidence that Ms. White would have made the same statements had she
not been illegally seized. In short, the discovery of contraband is not an applicable intervening
circumstance. (See also App. Br., p.25.)
Second, on the Miranda warnings, Ms. White respectfully refers the Court to the
discussion in her Appellant's Brief on why Miranda warnings do not purge the taint of an illegal
seizure under the Fourth Amendment. (App. Br., pp.21-24.) See also Downing, 163 Idaho at 30-

2

3

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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31 (finding no intervening circumstance when defendant made post-Miranda statements after
illegal pat-down search and rejecting attenuation doctrine).
In sum, the State has not established any intervening circumstance "entirely
unconnected" with Ms. White's illegal arrest to attenuate her statements from the taint of the
illegality. Utah v. Striejf, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2062 (2016). Ms. White's statements "flowed directly
from the illegal [arrest], with no intervening factors to consider." Downing, 163 Idaho at 31.
Because Ms. White's statements were a "direct outgrowth" of her illegal arrest, the attenuation
doctrine does not apply. Id.
On the other two factors for attenuation-elapsed time and purpose and flagrancy of
conduct-Ms. White maintains that these factors weigh in favor of suppression. (Resp. Br., p.21
(State agreeing elapsed time factor weighs in Ms. White's favor); R., p.95 (prosecution's
concession of elapsed time factor); App. Br., pp.24-26.) For all of these reasons, and those stated
in the Appellant's Brief, Ms. White submits that the district court erred by denying her motion to
suppress her statements.

II.
The District Court Erred By Denying Ms. White's Rule 36 Motion To Correct A Clerical Error
In The Judgment
At the sentencing hearing, the district court orally pronounced a sentence of three years,
with one year fixed. (Tr. Vol. IV,4 p.9, Ls.6-8; see App. Br., p.29.) The written judgment,
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There are four separate transcripts on appeal, contained in one electronic document titled,
"Transcript Appeal Volume 1 9-19-2019 10.08.42 28690998 FF744EAF-0DBA-40A8-94AD11D257CE1897.pdf." Each transcript is cited separately with reference to its internal pagination.
Citations to "Tr. Vol. I" refer to the motion to suppress hearing, held on April 18, 2019 (pages 1
to 8 of overall electronic document). Citations to "Tr. Vol. II" refer to the motion in limine
hearing, held on May 30, 2019 (pages 9 to 28). Citations to "Tr. Vol. III" refer to the change of
7

however, imposed a sentence of four years, with two years fixed. (R., p.202; see App. Br., p.29.)
The State agrees that the district court's judgment of conviction contained a clerical error in
imposing a harsher sentence than the sentence pronounced at the sentencing hearing. (App.
Br., pp.27-31; Resp. Br., pp.22-24.) Therefore, the State joins in Ms. White's request that this
Court reserve the district court's order denying her Rule 36 motion and remand this case to the
district court for a new judgment of conviction with the corrected sentence. (App. Br., p.31;
Resp. Br., p.24.)

CONCLUSION
Ms. White respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's order denying
her motion to suppress, vacate her judgment of conviction, and remand this case for further
proceedings.
Alternatively, m agreement with the State, she respectfully requests that this Court
reverse the district court's order denying her Rule 36 motion and remand this case for the district
court to enter a new judgment of conviction with the corrected sentence.
DATED this 4th day of June, 2020.

Isl Jenny C. Swinford
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

plea hearing, held on June 3, 2019 (pages 29 to 46). Citations to "Tr. Vol. IV" refer to the
sentencing hearing, held on August 15, 2019 (pages 47 to 60).
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 4 th day of June, 2020, I caused a true and correct copy
of the foregoing APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
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